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CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PRocEss-RIGHT OF AccusED TO WRIT OF
ERROR CoRAM NoBis-Petitioner, a nineteen year old Negro, was convicted of
rape in a circuit court of Alabama. The conviction, largely predicated on a
confession made by petitioner on July 3, 1946, to the local police, was affirmed
on April 24, 1947, by the Supreme Court of Alabama.1 This petition was subsequently initiated before the Alabama Supreme Court seeking an order granting
permission to petition the trial court for a writ of error coram nobis. The request
was accompanied by an allegation that petitioner's confession had been induced
by mental and physical torture administered by the local police. At no time
during the previous trial and appeal had petitioner or his counsel offered any
indication that his confession was not voluntary. In fact, all the testimony
concerning the confession was uncontradicted and was to the effect that petitioner
made the disclosure "to get it all off his chest." The petition in the new proceeding
was supported only by the affidavits of three men who had been in jail with petitioner
at the time of the confession. The state was allowed to introduce evidence, and
a hearing on the evidence was conducted by the Alabama Supreme Court which
held, by a vote of six to one, that the petition should be denied. 2 The denial of
an opportunity to be heard in the trial court was alleged by petitioner to be a
deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the United

1
2

Taylorv. State, 249 Ala. 130, 30 S. (2d) 256 (1947).
Ex Parte Taylor, 249 Ala. 667, 32 S. (2d) 659 (1947).
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RECENT DECISIONS

States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, affirmed. In view of the implausibility of the allegation of coercion, the Alabama court was within its constitutional
authority in denying the petition. Justice Murphy, in a dissenting opinion
concurred in by Justices Rutledge and Douglas, expressed the view that since
there was some evidence to substantiate petitioner's claim, he should be allowed a
hearing in the trial court. Taylor v. Alabama, 335 U.S. 252, 68 S.Ct. 1415
(1948).
It is now well settled that a conviction based on a confession secured by mental
or physical coercion is void as a denial of due process of law. 8 It is also clear that
due process requires that a state provide corrective procedure which will give a
prisoner an opportunity to establish as a matter of fact that his confession was
involuntary. 4 The only question involved here is whether the Alabama procedure
provided petitioner with sufficient opportunity to be heard on his allegation.
Habeas corpus was not available to petitioner because in Alabama the writ will
not issue to impeach a conviction where the record is regular on its face and the
proponent has only parol testimony to substantiate his claim.11 Apparently the
proper remedy under the circumstances was the writ of error coram nobis. To
petition a trial court for coram nobis, which is traditionally a special writ used
to secure the vacation of a former conviction because of a subsequently disclosed
mistake of fact, 6 it is necessary first to secure the permission of the appellate court
which affirmed the conviction sought to be set aside.7 The Alabama practice,
whereby the appellate court requires the petitioner to make a showing of reasonableness and probability of truthfulness in his claim before granting permission
to return to the trial court,8 is supported by authority 9 and reason.10 It seems
RorncHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw, § 327 (1939); Lisenba. v. California,
314 U.S. 219, 62 S.Ct. 280 (1941); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472
(1940); Hysler v. Florid~, 315 U.S. 411, 62 S.Ct. 688 (1941); Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921 (1944); Malinske v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S.Ct.
781 (1944).
4
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340 (1935); Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278 at 287, 56 S.Ct. 461 (1936).
11
Vernon v. State, 240 Ala. 577 at 581, 200 S. 560 (1941).
6
24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1606; United States v. Wright, (D.C. Ill. 1944)
56 F. Supp. 489; People v. Gilbert, 25 Cal. (2d) 422, 154 P. (2d) 657 (1944);
Johnson v. Williams, 244 Ala. 391, 13 S. (2d) 683 (1943); Kinsey v. State, 155 Fla.
159, 19 S. (2d) 706, cert. den. 324 U.S. 846, 65 S.Ct. 678 (1945); Grandbouche v.
People, 104 Colo. 175, 89 P. (2d) 577 (1939).
7
Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411, 62 S.Ct. 688 (1941); State v. Hudspeth, 191
Ark. 963, 88 S.W. (2d) 858 (1935); House v. State, 130 Fla. 400, 177 S. 705 (1937).
8
Johnson v. Williams, 244 Ala. 391, 13 S. (2d) 683 (1943).
9
Kinseyv. State, 155 Fla. 159, 19 S. (2d) 706, cert. den. 324 U.S. 846, 65 S.Ct.
678 (1945); State v. Kingman, 239 Wis. 188, 300 N.W. 244 (1941). See Young v.
United States, (C.C.A. 5th, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 838, where, in speaking of the writ
of coram nobis at p. 839, the court said, "If such a remedy still exists, permission to file
it will not be granted by an appellate court which has affirmed a conviction unless a
meritorious showing is made."
10
It seems clear that if securing the permission of the appellate court is to be anything
more than a mere formality, the appellate court cannot be bound to accept the petitioner's
allegations at face value.
8
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apparent that, if a petitioner has a valid basis for requesting the vacation of a
judgment by the trial court, requiring him to make a showing of validity before
the appellate court, places no undue burden upon him. Thus there would appear
to be little reason for disagreeing with the majority opinion in the principal case
that Alabama's criminal procedure in this respect meets the requirements of due
process. If the procedure is proper there could be no denial of due process unless
petitioner was refused the benefit of the established procedure by a clearly arbitrary
decision on the facts. 11 This does not appear to be the case. Even the dissenters
in the principal case would apparently agree that the Alabama court's conclusion
on the facts was not unreasonable, yet they contend that it was incorrect, apparently
giving more weight to the·evidence presented by the petitioner than did the state
court. This position would serve to make the United States Supreme Court a
tribunal for the review of findings of fact made in the state courts and for the
regulation of judicial procedures therein. It was also contended by the dissenters
that the Alabama practice of requiring a showing of truthfulness in petitioner's
claim was a denial of due process; that unless petitioner's claim appears untrue on
its face, a hearing before the trial court should be granted. It is suggested that
the dissenting position would make the obstructing of justice a simple matter for
any convicted defendant who can fabricate a defense plausible on its face, and
would place far greater restrictions on the states' power to regulate their own
judicial proceedings than can be justified as requirements of due process of law.12
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Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 at 285, 56 S.Ct. 461 (1936); Rogers v.
Peck, 199 U.S. 425 at 434, 26 S.Ct. 87 (1905).
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